AN EVIDENCE-BASED ASSESSMENT FOR POLICYMAKERS AND CONCERNED CITIZENS
When a U.S. politician promises a “sweet, vicious, and fast” raid to “save” a people from terrorism, the slogan is cinematic. History is not. Decades of U.S. counter-terror operations show a clear pattern: airpower can win battles and collapse regimes quickly, but it rarely produces lasting defeat of insurgent and terrorist movements.
Too often rapid kinetic action is followed by prolonged insurgency, civilian harm, state fragility, arms proliferation, and humanitarian suffering.
Below are five case studies — Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq/ISIS, Somalia, and Pakistan — that together show why a bombing-first approach is a poor “solution” for Nigeria.
1. Afghanistan (2001- 2021): Rapid regime collapse, twenty years of insurgencyThe U.S.-led invasion toppled the Taliban regime within weeks of October 2001. Yet the Taliban reconstituted as an insurgency that lasted two decades and returned to power after U.S. withdrawal in 2021. Tactical airpower and special operations achieved rapid displacement of the regime, but they did not create sustainable governance, inclusive politics, or economic stability — conditions insurgents exploit. The cycle demonstrates that quick military victories without durable political settlement can produce long-term failure.
Key lesson: Toppling a regime is not the same as eliminating an insurgency. Lasting security requires political inclusion and credible local institutions.
2. Libya (2011): Regime removal that fueled a regional security disasterNATO airstrikes in 2011 helped remove Muammar Gaddafi. The short-term objective — regime change — was achieved; the long term was catastrophic. Libya’s collapse produced vast caches of conventional weapons and a vacuum of authority that fed violent non-state actors across the Sahel for years afterward. The spread of arms and fighters from Libya helped destabilise Mali, Niger, and parts of northern Nigeria. The Libyan example shows how external use of force can create the very insecurity it claims to fix.
Key lesson: Military interventions that remove state control but do not provide stabilisation and governance can turn a local conflict into a regional crisis.
3. Iraq & the “Territorial” ISIS defeat (2014–2019): Territory lost, network survivesThe U.S.-led coalition’s air campaign and partner ground forces removed ISIS’s territorial “caliphate” in Iraq and Syria between 2014 and 2019. That was a major operational success: cities like Mosul and Raqqa were recaptured. But ISIS survived as an insurgent network and inspired affiliates around the world. Airstrikes degraded ISIS, yet did not erase the political, social, and economic grievances that breed extremism. Persistent remnants continued guerrilla attacks and inspired lone actors internationally.
Key lesson: Defeating a group’s territorial hold is necessary but insufficient — without stabilisation, governance, and economic recovery, insurgent ideologies endure.
4. Somalia (2007–present): Persistent al-Shabab despite repeated strikesThe United States and partners have used airstrikes, drone strikes, and special operations against al-Shabab for years. These operations have removed leaders and disrupted operations, but al-Shabab remains resilient and capable of mass-casualty attacks. Civilian casualties from imprecise strikes sometimes bolster recruitment and local grievances. The Somalia case highlights the limits of an air-centric approach against a group embedded in local grievances and lacking a clear central target to “destroy.”
Key lesson: Degradation of a group’s capabilities by strikes must be matched by political reconciliation, reconstruction, and local legitimacy to be durable.
5. Pakistan drone campaign (2004–2018+): Targeted killings with mixed strategic effectsIn Pakistan and neighbouring tribal areas, drone strikes killed militant leaders and disrupted networks, but studies show mixed strategic outcomes: some strikes removed operational leaders, others provoked civilian casualties and anger that aided recruitment. Amnesty International and academic research note possible unlawful killings and significant civilian harm, complicating long-term counter-terrorism objectives.
Key lesson: Targeted kinetic action can produce short-term tactical benefits while inflaming public sentiment and undermining legitimacy — a poor trade if long-term stability is the goal.
Cross-cutting themes:
Why bombing alone fails
Tactical success strategic victory. Airpower removes fighters and terrain but does not resolve governance, inequality, or exclusion — the underlying causes of insurgency.
Insurgents adapt. When territory is lost, groups go underground, fragment into small cells, or inspire new affiliates — harder to target and eradicate.
Civilian harm fuels recruitment. Evidence from Pakistan and Somalia shows that civilian casualties increase grievances and can boost recruitment for militant groups.
State collapse and arms proliferation spread insecurity. Libya is a cautionary tale: removing a central authority without a stabilisation plan can export violence across borders.
Diplomatic legitimacy and sovereignty matter. External raids that ignore local institutions undermine legitimacy and can empower anti-foreign narratives militants exploit.What this means for Nigeria and for any politician promising “fast, vicious, and sweet” raids
A U.S. raid — even if militarily feasible — would likely produce short-term headlines but not a durable end to terrorism in Nigeria. Worse, it risks:
Civilian casualties that deepen grievances and recruitment;
Allowing a legitimate argument to an Islamic state sponsor like Iran to actively fund resistance Islamic pockets within Nigeria to counter Trump’s perceived “Christian crusade” in Nigeria;
Cross-border spillovers and arms flows;
Undermining Nigerian sovereignty and local state legitimacy;
Distracting from the slower, harder work of reforming governance, security sector capacity, and social cohesion.
The historical record argues for caution. If the objective is enduring security for Nigerians of all faiths, then kinetic options must be embedded in a political strategy that includes local ownership, credible governance, justice measures, reconstruction, and long-term socio-economic investment.
Evidence-based policy alternatives (short list)
Intelligence sharing and joint operations: Help Nigerian forces with real-time intelligence and joint planning rather than unilateral strikes.
Train-and-equip for accountability: Provide training, equipment, and logistics tied to accountability, human-rights safeguards, and maintenance support.
Stabilisation & governance programs:Fund local administration, rule-of-law initiatives, local policing, and community reconciliation where militants recruit.
Targeted sanctions and law enforcement cooperation: Go after financing, illicit arms flows, and transnational facilitation networks.
Regional cooperative architecture: Work with ECOWAS, the African Union, and neighboring states on border control, refugee protection, and weapons interdiction.
Conclusion
History is emphatic: bombing can be decisive in a battle but rarely delivers a permanent political solution to terrorism. The record from Afghanistan to Libya, Iraq, Somalia, and Pakistan shows cycles of temporary success followed by adaptation, diffusion, and prolonged suffering. For Nigeria, the evidence recommends restraint toward performative external raids and a focus on partnership, intelligence, institution-building, and addressing the root causes that create the market for militants. Those are not “fast” or flashy; they are messy, expensive, and take time — but they are the only path history shows to durable peace.
Source: Sundiata Post